Password Consulting Services, Cali Colombia jose. Desafortunadamente este estndar aun no est aplicado en el desarrollo de software en Colombia. Francisco Pino, Ph. From these results we developed a model, which achieves software conceptualized in a TOE Target of evaluation which corresponds to an ICT Information and Communications , and evaluated according to a ST Secure Target Common Criteria portal officer, under the functions and required levels in order to identify shortcomings in compliance and safety recommendations for improvement.
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Characteristics of these organizations were examined and presented at ICCC In September , a majority of members of the CCRA produced a vision statement whereby mutual recognition of CC evaluated products will be lowered to EAL 2 Including augmentation with flaw remediation.
Further, this vision indicates a move away from assurance levels altogether and evaluations will be confined to conformance with Protection Profiles that have no stated assurance level. This will be achieved through technical working groups developing worldwide PPs, and as yet a transition period has not been fully determined. The emergence of international Technical Communities iTC , groups of technical experts charged with the creation of cPPs.
A transition plan from the previous CCRA, including recognition of certificates issued under the previous version of the Arrangement.
Requirements[ edit ] Common Criteria is very generic; it does not directly provide a list of product security requirements or features for specific classes of products: this follows the approach taken by ITSEC , but has been a source of debate to those used to the more prescriptive approach of other earlier standards such as TCSEC and FIPS Value of certification[ edit ] Common Criteria certification cannot guarantee security, but it can ensure that claims about the security attributes of the evaluated product were independently verified.
In other words, products evaluated against a Common Criteria standard exhibit a clear chain of evidence that the process of specification, implementation, and evaluation has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner. Various Microsoft Windows versions, including Windows Server and Windows XP , have been certified , but security patches to address security vulnerabilities are still getting published by Microsoft for these Windows systems. This is possible because the process of obtaining a Common Criteria certification allows a vendor to restrict the analysis to certain security features and to make certain assumptions about the operating environment and the strength of threats faced by the product in that environment.
Additionally, the CC recognizes a need to limit the scope of evaluation in order to provide cost-effective and useful security certifications, such that evaluated products are examined to a level of detail specified by the assurance level or PP. Evaluations activities are therefore only performed to a certain depth, use of time, and resources and offer reasonable assurance for the intended environment.
In the Microsoft case, the assumptions include A. PEER: "Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be under the same management control and operate under the same security policy constraints. The TOE is applicable to networked or distributed environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and resides within a single management domain.
There are no security requirements that address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to such systems. Based on this and other assumptions, which may not be realistic for the common use of general-purpose operating systems, the claimed security functions of the Windows products are evaluated.
Thus they should only be considered secure in the assumed, specified circumstances, also known as the evaluated configuration. Alternatively, the vendor should re-evaluate the product to include the application of patches to fix the security vulnerabilities within the evaluated configuration.
This shows both the limitation and strength of an evaluated configuration. Evaluation focuses primarily on assessing the evaluation documentation, not on the actual security, technical correctness or merits of the product itself. For U. The effort and time necessary to prepare evaluation evidence and other evaluation-related documentation is so cumbersome that by the time the work is completed, the product in evaluation is generally obsolete.
In a research paper, computer specialist David A. Wheeler suggested that the Common Criteria process discriminates against free and open-source software FOSS -centric organizations and development models.
In contrast, much FOSS software is produced using modern agile paradigms. Although some have argued that both paradigms do not align well,  others have attempted to reconcile both paradigms. In this approach, communities of interest form around technology types which in turn develop protection profiles that define the evaluation methodology for the technology type.
There is some concern that this may have a negative impact on mutual recognition.
ISO/IEC DIS 15408-2