Qual seria o modelo a ser adotado? Foi um boom que teve tudo a ver com a retomada, pelo governo federal, do investimento em obras na cidade. EM: O que isso significa? Eu tenho fotografias que mostro de conjuntos habitacionais com vacas pastando ao lado.
|Published (Last):||15 May 2011|
|PDF File Size:||11.70 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||2.6 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
This interview was originally conducted in Portuguese, and translated by the author. In addition to having published 11 books and contributed nearly 40 book chapters, her lectures, often in public forums and protests, regularly draw large crowds of young people.
But she is not merely an academic. Maricato was a key player in four of the most important moments in the last 30 years of Brazilian urban reform. Maricato was an actor in the movement that created and ratified, through popular petition, articles and of the Brazilian constitution These articles declare that the social function of property overrides the profit motive and set guidelines for radical urban reform.
In this position, Maricato helped create innovative policies that provided technical support for urban social movements to appropriate abandoned buildings and vacant land and convert the properties to self-managed social housing in accordance with the constitution—policies that were later replicated in hundreds of cities across Brazil.
She was active in helping create and ratify the landmark Statute of the City in , which creates guidelines for adherence to constitutional articles and and mandates that every city with a population over 20, has to facilitate a regular participatory development plan with full budget transparency. These protests were billed by their coordinators as warmups for a national strike that will begin on April A large part of it was based on direct democracy. I think the most important program of this period was participatory budgeting.
We were living in a period of low investment—there was no money. It was a period of crisis and IMF structural adjustments. In addition to participatory budgeting, we created a housing policy that generated a lot of positive results based on technical support from architects, engineers and social workers, so that the social movements could build their own houses.
This was one of our most successful programs and there is a legacy in that it has been continued in cities across Brazil up to this day. We also started a very important strategy of urbanization in precarious areas and favelas. What exactly does this mean? The working class and poor city is ignored and forgotten by public policy during the usual governments. We looked at this forgotten, informal and illegal city, lacking in urban services and equipment and understood that this was our priority.
These mayoral administrations inverted priorities and facilitated participatory processes to deliberate on policy and resource allocation. Lula served two terms and was followed by President Dilma Rousseff.
My main thesis for why it changed is because money appeared. Public resources appeared. So we entered the 21th Century with the new concept that the Federal Government had resources and was going to invest in cities. When the resources began to arrive, our virtuous, participatory project lost space. It lost space because Capital began to take over urban policy.
There was a change in the power relationship that had supported city governments and that were much more democratic and participatory. When resources returned, Capital—the big construction companies and the real estate coalitions—gained space and began to take over urban policy. This is what I show in my last two books. The virtuous cycle entered in decline, although some mayoral administrations continued to urbanize favelas by investing in mobility through construction of express bus corridors which is a lot cheaper than investing in subways , prioritizing collective transport and housing through technical assistance to social movements.
During the Luiza Erundina administration we tried to make a pact with the business community and it had a hard time accepting us- it was even harder for the media. We have a very unequal society in Brazil and we have very high segregation levels in our cities. When you compare the elite part of the city to the part where the workers live you see that the workers are mainly black, have low income levels, low education levels and suffer from high crime, much higher levels of mosquito borne illnesses and much lower life expectancy.
We had interesting dialogues about this with the Brazilian business community, both before and during the coalition politics era of Lulismo but this has now disappeared. The idea that you could invest in areas that do not make up part of this ideological representation of the city, which is a kind of visiting room for white people with money, is very difficult these days and only possible through a very advanced power coalition.
A large part of these women work in the domestic service sector in this white, middle and upper income city. At the height of our urban reform movement we fought for and built a new federal constitution that is very democratic. We fought for and built a legal framework that was absolutely new, through measures like the Statute of the City, new sanitation and urban mobility legislation and the Statute of the Metropolis.
We were able to build an innovative legal framework but it did not end up being implemented in very many places. This is a very Brazilian phenomenon—there are advanced laws but the legislation is applied in a discriminatory fashion. We have a conservative judiciary which treats part of the city as illegal and this is where the poor people live. It is a population that lives in informality in a part of the city that has no urbanization. During PT city governments and some progressive administrations by the PDT or PC do B parties we radically focused on this segregated, excluded part of the population.
These conservative governments opened space for the capitalists to organize and propose their project for the city. Haddad democratized its public spaces by penalizing the circulation of automobiles in favor of pedestrian and bicycle traffic and by favoring collective transport and lowering automobile speed limits.
Unfortunately, he sided with the conservatives on housing issues for the first three years of his mandate because of the Lulismo coalition and class alliances, and his housing policy only began to flourish with democratic policies during his last year in office.
But his participatory master development plan was interesting, especially because it enabled the return of the municipal rural zone and provided great innovation through its food security and nutritional policy.
In short, he introduced some new things to our old agenda. In this article, Anderson says that when Lula took office, he immediately adapted a neoliberal policy platform and implies that he increased social spending as a political defense strategy after a corruption scandal broke in You were the Executive Secretary of the Ministry of the Cities during this period.
What was the initial goal of the Ministry of the Cities, what changed, and why did it end up losing power by the end of the Dilma Rousseff administration? I had left the PT party at the time because I was unhappy with a few things related to historic commitments, but when Lula invited me to create this project I felt that it was important for us to work on a nation-wide proposal. There were some interesting people inside of the Urban Development Secretariat but, without any doubt whatsoever, he followed the Washington Consensus.
Lula maintained an ambiguous posture between financial sector interests, the traditional interests of the large land owners and the interests of the working class. This is the national bourgeoisie that suffered setbacks and started to either disappear or internationalize during the Collor and Fernando Henrique Cardoso administrations. Lula bet on a policy of rebuilding Brazilian industry that now, with the Lava Jato [v] investigation and the resurgence of neoliberalism, has started to receive fatal blows.
This is because the strong nationalists that you had until recently were the big businessmen, and the petroleum sector which strengthened the shipbuilding industry and the shipyards.
In my opinion, this was the most important thing he did. Lula increased the minimum salary and redistributed income through the Bolsa Familia program. He caused a huge increase in the number of working class and poor students in the university system through the PROUNI program. Luz para Todos light for everyone got everyone onto the electrical grid.
These were important but the fact is that Lula operated ambiguously by not openly opposing financial and landowning elites while, at the same time, favoring the workers. Lula still thinks this way to this day—that there is no solution through confrontation in Brazil. If we consider that we have suffered from a process of deindustrialization for the last 30 years I think that he could have a point but do not agree with this posture of non-confrontation. When Perry Anderson wrote that article about Lula, he based it mainly on the works of Francisco Oliveira, a Brazilian author who broke with Lula during the first years of his government and became a very strong critic.
I was invited to create the Ministry of the Cities and I encountered difficulties within the government. You are in a coalition and sometimes you have disputes within the same party. Some disputes are out of vanity or egos and some disputes are political. In the beginning of the Lula government there was an internal dispute with the Ministry of the Cities under Olivio Dutra and our exceptional team.
It was such a good team that our sanitation department managed to hold a meeting with the IMF and convince them to free up resources that were blocked through the conditionality agreement. Because this marvelous Ministry of the Cities team convinced the IMF that the application of funds for sanitation is not an expenditure, as the IMF accounting section treated it at the time, but an investment.
But there was a lot of conflict within the government. At that time, even during the Lula Government, the Minister of the Treasury was in favor of the structural adjustments.
When we discussed sanitation there were people inside the government arguing in favor of privatization, which we opposed. It was a party that was tied to the construction industry. So at that moment I left the PT and returned to teaching. It was clear that the cycle of democratic urban policy with direct democracy and an inversion of priorities which started in the s was ending.
The National Cities Conference was a huge national meeting that originated in the municipalities. The municipalities had conferences where delegates were elected to represent them at the state conferences. It seemed perfect from the point of view of popular, democratic participation. But more and more I think that these local leaders and social movements also took the path towards institutional space.
They abandoned a political strategy that was more based on the ground, on the streets, in the factories, the neighborhoods, the schools, the hospitals, where we started from. The income distribution and job creation policies in the Lula government were exceptional.
There is absolutely no way that they can be belittled. But from the point of view of political action I think that there was a cushioning of the transformative capacity to advance emancipation of the poor.
I say this especially about the black population, which is very, very, very discriminated against in Brazil, and especially about women heads of households. There is a perception propagated in the international media that what happened last year was not a coup because it was a legal process. What is your opinion on this? There is no doubt whatsoever that what happened in Brazil was a coup.
Together, they are behaving like a political party that defends the interests of the upper middle class. They began to build this idea that there was never as much corruption as there was during the PT governments. Was there corruption? Yes, without a doubt. During his second term the size of the coalition increased.
But now we can all see that corruption was used as an excuse to hold a coup. We are seeing now that corruption is fully integrated into this new government. This is clear in the accusations coming out from the Lava Jato investigation, which affect every major political party. As someone who left the PT years ago and has no party ties, I can clearly affirm that this is persecution.
You cannot have justice with persecution against one predetermined political party. Lava Jato could change Brazil and it would be very important if it did.
Erminia Maricato: ‘A reconquista da democracia brasileira passa pelas cidades’
Overcoming Deep Inequality in Brazilian Cities: An Interview with Erminia Maricato