BUILDING A SECURE COMPUTER SYSTEM MORRIE GASSER PDF

Operating systems must be flexible in their support for security policies, providing sufficient mechanisms for supporting the wide variety of real-world security policies. Such flexibility requires controlling the propagation of access rights, enforcing fine-grained access rights and supporting the Such flexibility requires controlling the propagation of access rights, enforcing fine-grained access rights and supporting the revocation of previously granted access rights. Previous systems are lacking in at least one of these areas. In this paper we present an operating system security architecture that solves these problems. Control over propagation is provided by ensuring that the security policy is consulted for every security decision.

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Operating systems must be flexible in their support for security policies, providing sufficient mechanisms for supporting the wide variety of real-world security policies. Such flexibility requires controlling the propagation of access rights, enforcing fine-grained access rights and supporting the Such flexibility requires controlling the propagation of access rights, enforcing fine-grained access rights and supporting the revocation of previously granted access rights.

Previous systems are lacking in at least one of these areas. In this paper we present an operating system security architecture that solves these problems. Control over propagation is provided by ensuring that the security policy is consulted for every security decision.

This control is achieved without significant performance degradation through the use of a security decision caching mechanism that ensures a consistent view of policy decisions. Both fine-grained access rights and revocation support are provided by mechanisms that are directly integrated into the service-providing components of the system.

The architecture is described through its prototype implementation in the Flask microkernelbased operating system, and the policy flexibility of the prototype is evaluated. Moreover, our architecture is applicable to many other types of operating systems and environments. The majority of attacks made upon modern computers have been successful due to the exploitation of the same errors and weaknesses that have plagued computer systems for the last thirty years.

Because the industry has not learned from these mistakes, new protocols and systems are not designed with th Because the industry has not learned from these mistakes, new protocols and systems are not designed with the aspect of security in mind; and security that is present is typically added as an afterthought. What makes these systems so vulnerable is that the security design process is based upon assumptions that have been made in the past; assumptions which now have become obsolete or irrelevant.

In addition, fundamental errors in the design and implementation of systems repeatedly occur, which lead to failures. Chapman-Hall , " This paper discusses the realization of mandatory access control in role-based protection systems. Starting from the basic definitions of roles, their application in security and the basics of the concept of mandatory access control, we develop a scheme of role-based protection that realizes mandato Starting from the basic definitions of roles, their application in security and the basics of the concept of mandatory access control, we develop a scheme of role-based protection that realizes mandatory access control.

The basis of this formulation develops from the recognition that roles can be seen as facilitating access to some given information context.

By handling each of the role contexts as independent security levels of information, we simulate mandatory access by imposing the requirements of mandatory access control.

Among the key considerations, we propose a means of taming Trojan horses by imposing acyclic information flow among contexts in role-based protection systems. The acyclic information flows and suitable access rules incorporate secrecy which is an essential component of mandatory access control. Keywords Security level, information flow, mandatory access control, r Since the advent of distributed systems, security of software systems has been an issue of immense concern.

Traditionally, security is incorporated in a software system after all the functional requirements have been addressed. This paper argues for the need for security concerns to be an integral p This paper argues for the need for security concerns to be an integral part of the entire software development life cycle. Different research areas that lie at the confluence of Software Engineering and Security are surveyed.

Finally, the paper focuses on the use of Software Architecture to solve certain problems that are faced in the engineering of secure systems. The UNtxt operating system is designed for collaborative work and not for security. Vendors have modified this operating system in some cases, radically to provide levels of security acceptable to their customers, but the versions used in supercomputing environments would benefit from enhancements Vendors have modified this operating system in some cases, radically to provide levels of security acceptable to their customers, but the versions used in supercomputing environments would benefit from enhancements present in so-called secure versions.

This paper discusses the need for security in a supercomputing environment and suggests modifications to the UNIX operating system that would decrease the vulnerability of those sites to attacks. Among the issues are additional auditing controls, changes to network programs, improved user authentication, and better application of the principle of least privilege.

Mattmann " Trustworthiness can be regarded as a combination of other NFRs such security, dependability, reli-ability, and so on. We should emphasize that trust is a much broa We should emphasize that trust is a much broader issue than just security [2].

A system can be secure but still not trustworthy if it cannot recover from failures or is not reliable in producing results. A trusted system has been described as one that is responsible for enforcing security, and consequently the security of the system depends on its flawless operation [3].

In an idealized scenario, a trustworthy system is one on which the user s can completely rely. In support of this, we identify a set of trustworthiness dimensions and briefly survey how they have been addressed in existing research. Finally, we try to relate, and study the impact of, the dimen-sions of trustworthiness to those of software architectures.

It would be secure, reliable, dependable and robust, and at the same time research literature is almos Brock, Paul C. Clark, Cynthia E. Irvine, Brock Jerome P , " Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.

Send comments Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Show Context Citation Context Thesoperating system prompts the user to enter his user ID.

It then prompts the user to entershis password. The operating system then looks up the password entry for the suppliedsuser ID in an inter Supporting the secure halting of user sessions and processes in the Linux operating system

CONCEPTO DE CATABOLISMO Y ANABOLISMO PDF

Building a Secure Computer System

Kenos Reference Guide for Security in Networks This reference guide is provided to aid in understanding security concepts and their application in various network architectures. Government Printing Office number The DoD criteria for evaluating and rating operating systems according to a scale based on security features and gaxser. The password mechanism is an internal control that obviates the need for external controls such as locked terminal rooms. Also, many vendors have not yet shown an interest in submitting their products for evaluation. Morrie Gasser — PDF Hence, as long as relatively easy, non-technical ways exist to commit a crime, technical controls will be viewed as superfluous.

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Building a secure computer system

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Building a Secure Computer System by Morrie Gasser (1988, Hardcover)

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